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THE SUPREME COURT’S RENEWED FOCUS ON 
INEFFICIENTLY STRUCTURED JOINT VENTURES 
Stephen F. Ross* 
Antitrust courts and commentators have long appreciated that joint 
ventures among rival firms have the potential to provide benefits to 
consumers and the economy through synergies and economies of scale, but 
also raise the potential of lessening competition among the venture 
principals.  The case law and academic literature have often ignored, 
however, the potential harm that befalls consumers when joint ventures 
with market power are structured in a manner that gives the principals the 
ability to direct policy and a strategy in a manner that advances their 
parochial self-interest, rather than the interests of the venture-as-a-whole.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Needle, Inc., v. NFL 
properly focused on the difference between a single economic entity (like a 
corporation) and the typical sports league, which is governed by club 
owners who act in the interests of their own clubs.  It suggests a renewed 
opportunity for antitrust enforcers to consider the structure of joint 
ventures that do not face rigorous competition from other providers of 
similar goods and services, when analyzing antitrust challenges to either 
specific venture decisions, or to the structure of the venture itself.  In this 
regard, this Essay proposes a workable standard for evaluating joint 
ventures, focusing on whether decision makers have a fiduciary duty to, 
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and economic incentives aligned with, the profitability of the venture-as-a-
whole. 
INTRODUCTION 
In markets that do not feature vigorous competition among many 
independent firms, two discrete anticompetitive problems can arise when 
separate economic actors agree to cooperate with each other.  The foremost 
concern is that consumers will be harmed by the elimination of competition 
among the parties to the agreement.  But, when the parties’ agreement is 
not a complete integration of economic activities through merger, 
consumers also face the risk that the parties’ partial integration (usually 
labeled as a ‘joint venture’) will be inefficiently structured, allowing 
individual firms’ independent self-interests to block welfare-maximizing 
initiatives that may benefit consumers and the firm-as-a-whole.  Indeed, 
successful joint ventures are rare because, among other reasons, companies 
with different interests, management styles, and goals find it difficult to 
cooperate on a practical level as business partners.
1
  Inefficient decision-
making by firms that face vigorous rivals do not harm consumers, who can 
switch their patronage to substitute goods and services.  But when the 
venture offers goods or services for which there are no reasonable 
substitutes, consumers may find themselves victimized to a greater degree 
than those subject to Standard Oil or Microsoft’s monopolistic practices:  
not only suffer from the price increases or quality unresponsiveness that 
follows from the elimination of competition, but also from the peculiar 
inefficiencies of cartel-like behavior. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Needle, Inc., v. 
NFL reaffirms the Sherman Act’s potency in protecting consumers against 
both these harms.
2
  The Court explicitly held that § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
which bans unreasonable agreements in restraint of trade,
3
 applies to 
decisions of a putative ‘single entity’ when that entity is governed by 
economically separate entities and “when the parties to the agreement act 
on interests separate from those of the firm itself.”
4
  American Needle, Inc., 
a sporting goods manufacturer, could therefore challenge, as an 
unreasonable conspiracy in restraint of trade, the decision by the club 
owners who govern National Football League Properties (NFLP)—the 
 
 1. Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a 
Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 63 n.3 (1987). 
2.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 3. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”). 
 4. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2215. 
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NFL’s marketing subsidiary—to grant a license for each NFL club’s logos 
and trademarks to a single merchandise manufacturer.
5 
 This was because, 
as Justice Stevens explained for the unanimous Court in the final antitrust 
opinion of his illustrious career, “each team’s decision reflects not only an 
interest in NFLP’s profits but also an interest in the team’s individual 
profits.”
6
  Thus, consistent with the approach announced in the Court’s 
prior decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
7
 the 
league’s licensing policies were unlike “a multiple team of horses drawing 
a vehicle under the control of a single driver,”
8 
but rather were properly 
characterized as an agreement between competing clubs, such that the 
agreement “deprive[d] the marketplace of independent centers of decision-
making.”
9
 
Although earlier work has discussed the importance of the way in 
which decision-making occurs in joint ventures,
10
 and how individual 
principals within ventures may prefer inefficient, output-reducing decisions 
that are nonetheless profitable for their particular firm,
11
 this Essay explores 
how American Needle can be implemented.  This Essay also suggests 
opportunities for new scrutiny of the inefficient structure of joint ventures 
with market power.  First, the Essay explicitly distinguishes two discrete 
antitrust problems arising from joint ventures:  Competition can be reduced 
by the elimination of rivalry between the venture parties; consumer welfare 
can also be reduced when the structure of an otherwise welfare-enhancing 
joint venture is too likely to result in inefficient business decisions based on 
the parochial self-interest of the venture’s principals.  Second, the Essay 
discusses how antitrust law should deal with these discrete problems, by 
focusing first on the formation of a venture and next on its structure.  
Although antitrust analysis of whether a joint venture’s formation is 
anticompetitive has attracted significant judicial and scholarly discussion,
12
 
proper analysis of a venture’s structure has been relatively ignored.
13
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 8. Id. at 771. 
 9. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2212, quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769. 
   10. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures]. 
 11. Id. at 50.  See also id. at 54 (“[T]he structure and nature of joint ventures is such 
that they can often make decision in ways that do not maximize the profits of the venture as 
a whole.”). 
 12. See generally A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, 1 ANTITRUST L. DEV.  (6th ed. 
2007), ch. 4 (discussing antitrust analysis of joint ventures); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework 
for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1986); Joseph Brodley, Joint 
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint 
Ventures, supra note 10, at 53.  
 13. Even Professor Brodley’s seminal work devotes minimal attention to the harm that 
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This Essay argues that courts should not limit their inquiry to the 
reduction of rivalry between the parties, but should consider structural 
issues related to the venture as well.  Courts should ascertain a venture’s 
market power and then demarcate a clear line between those ventures 
governed by decision-makers whose only incentives are to benefit the 
venture-as-a-whole, and those ventures governed by decision-makers with 
divergent economic and legal incentives.  This focus tracks, although is not 
identical to, the inquiry familiar to corporate lawyers with regard to related-
party transactions.
14
 Where substance may not follow form, courts should 
 
is the focus of this Essay.  Brodley identifies collusion, loss of potential competition, and 
market exclusion as three “anticompetitive risks” about which antitrust policy ought to be 
concerned.  Brodley, supra note 12, at 1530–34, and mentions only in passing the 
transactions costs problems that joint ventures encounter when serving “two masters.”  Id. at 
1529.  Likewise, Pitofsky’s important work expresses concern about lessened competition 
between the principals, and between the joint venture and one or more principals, and 
particular problems with rights of access. Pitofsky, supra note 12, at 1608–14.  Even with 
regard to access rights issues (which raise problems similar to those addressed in this Essay, 
in that independently owned essential facilities would usually be happy to allow access to as 
many firms willing to pay the monopoly price as possible), which typically arise where the 
facility is controlled by one or more of the plaintiff’s rivals, the Pitofsky article does not 
discuss the structure of the venture as a critical variable warranting close antitrust scrutiny.  
The leading study to address this is Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures, supra note 10, 
although the issue is not the principal focus of his article.  Hovenkamp returns to this issue 
in Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 813 (2011) [hereinafter Hovenkamp & Leslie]. 
  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle, a veteran 
Antitrust Division economist has addressed this issue, observing, consistent with the 
conclusions of this Essay, that “a joint venture is treated as a single economic entity when 
its participants can be expected to maximize the venture’s profits rather than act on the 
interests they have outside the venture.” Gregory J. Werden, Two Propositions on the 
Application of the Sherman Act to Joint Ventures after Dagher and American Needle (May 
2011) (on file with author).  The decision in American Needle is thoughtfully reviewed in 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1478d, at 350–67 (3d ed. 
2010) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP]. 
 14. With regard to conflicts of interest in joint ventures, the prime focus of corporate 
law literature is on acts of commission, typically the seizing of a corporate opportunity by a 
venture party that allegedly should have been taken by the joint venture.  Another sort of 
conflict is also problematic:  acts of omission where individual venture partners block 
initiatives that will enhance the venture’s overall profitability, but not in a uniform way.  
Suppose Steve, Marco, and Sam create the SMS commercial real estate venture with 
unanimous consent required for major decisions.  The question of Steve’s liability if he were 
to individually secure a good bargain to develop a new shopping mall, instead of allowing 
SMS to make the investment, is discussed in detail in Shishido, supra note 1, at 91–112, 
building upon the framework articulated in Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look 
at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1047 (1981) and A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
1986).  Far less attention is paid if Marco were to veto SMS’s lucrative investment because 
he did not want a new mall to compete with an existing shopping mall in which he 
individually had a large investment.  Professor Shishido sensibly observes that the problem 
of minority oppression is less acute in joint ventures than in closely held corporations, 
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inquire whether there is a possibility that the joint venture’s governance is 
structured in a manner that creates a significant risk that the decision will 
be inconsistent with the interests of the entity as a whole.  This approach 
draws on the Supreme Court’s doctrine of distinguishing agreements from 
parallel independent behavior.
15
  In reviewing challenges to decisions made 
by joint ventures with market power that are controlled by self-interested 
principals, courts should closely scrutinize the challenged decision for 
reasonableness.  Additionally, in cases of persistent unreasonableness, 
courts should evaluate whether consumer welfare would be enhanced by 
structural relief requiring that the venture be governed by those solely 
concerned with the venture-as-a-whole. 
Finally, the Essay applies this approach to a structural variation on 
American Needle, to an earlier sports broadcasting decision that was 
settled, and to non-sports antitrust litigation involving credit card 
processing ventures.  These cases illustrate how close scrutiny, and in some 
cases structural relief, can more effectively protect consumers against 
welfare-reducing, parochially self-interested decisions by firms that control 
joint ventures with market power.
16
 
I.  TWO DISCRETE PROBLEMS 
When competition is not so vigorous that firms who disserve 
consumers face swift retribution,
17
 two discrete anticompetitive problems 
may arise from a joint venture in that market.  The first is the well-
recognized formation problem:  Consumer welfare may be significantly 
reduced by eliminating competition between the parties in the relevant 
 
because the parties tend to be sophisticated economic actors who each contribute to the 
venture, giving each party negotiating leverage.  Shishido, supra note 1, at 72.  Although 
these factors may well allow venture parties to protect their own interests, the venture 
cannot be relied upon to protect the public interest in the efficient operation of a venture 
with market power. 
 15. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 
(1986) (stating that conspiracy requires evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” that 
the defendants’ conduct was independent). 
 16. There may well be situations where (i) a joint venture’s benefits outweigh harms; 
(ii) centralized control limits competition; and (iii) allocating governance rights to 
individual principals actually benefits consumers, in the same way that consumers benefit 
when a member of a cartel ‘cheats’ on an anti-competitive agreement. See Hovenkamp & 
Leslie, supra note 13 (providing an analysis of cartel management).  Consistent with the 
approach advocated in this Essay, these situations are best identified by antitrust courts’ 
holding that the venture in question is not a single entity, but under § 1, a decentralized 
governance structure is the lawful approach for the venture to adopt. 
 17. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Redfield Imp., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Posner, J.) (“A firm that has no market power is unlikely to adopt policies that disserve its 
consumers; it cannot afford to.  And if it blunders and does adopt such a policy, market 
retribution will be swift.”). 
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market, in which case the appropriate antitrust result is to bar collaboration 
and restore rivalry between the joint venture principals.  Alternatively, and 
beyond the scope of this Essay, the formation of a joint venture may be 
problematic because the agreement forming the venture includes 
unnecessary collateral restraints on the parties’ non-venture behavior, in 
which case the appropriate antitrust result is to invalidate those restraints 
while permitting the pro-competitive aspects of the venture to proceed.  
The second is a structural problem:  Consumer welfare may be enhanced 
by some form of collaboration among the parties, but policies or 
agreements that flow from the self-interest of the individual parties may 
reduce consumer welfare.  Moreover, a venture structured to vest decision-
making authority in those solely interested in enhancing the venture-as-a-
whole may be more likely to produce a welfare-enhancing result that 
offsets any harm to competition caused by the limitation on rivalry of the 
venture partners.  An inefficiently structured joint venture with market 
power is likely to produce a result akin to a problem economists have 
identified as one of double monopoly, where consumers are harmed by 
monopoly profits and further harmed if a second monopolist handles 
distribution.
18
 
The Second Circuit recognized this second structural problem in an 
early sports antitrust decision.
19
  Rebuffing the same single entity argument 
that the Supreme Court rejected in American Needle, the court expressed its 
concern about two different types of harms that might occur if the antitrust 
laws did not constrain sports team owners’ decisions.  First, the Second 
Circuit noted that sports leagues could enter into agreements that would 
benefit the league, but that anticompetitive effects would outweigh these 
benefits.  Second, the court observed that sports leagues might adopt the 
restraint more for their own protection from competition, than for the 
welfare of the league itself.
20
 
 
 18. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy 
Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 7 (2004) (citing DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. 
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 398 (3d ed. 1999)); see generally Roger D. 
Blair, David L. Kaserman, & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral 
Monopoly, 55 SO. ECON. J. 831, 831 (1989) (explaining the theory’s foundation as 
developed in AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPLES MATHEMATIQUES DE LA 
THEORIE DES RICHESSES (1838) (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., RESEARCHES INTO THE 
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1927)). 
 19. N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 20. Id.  
  The characterization of the NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt 
from the Sherman Act an agreement between its members to restrain 
competition.  To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to 
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would 
benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit 
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects.  Moreover, the restraint 
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The concurring opinion in an earlier single entity case clearly 
expressed the point.  Judge Richard Cudahy, disagreeing with the panel 
majority’s suggestion that the National Basketball Association might be 
considered a single entity with respect to broadcasting rules,
21
 believed the 
league was more like a joint venture whose agreements should be subject to 
analysis under § 1.  According to Judge Cudahy, joint ventures warrant 
antitrust scrutiny 
for at least two reasons—(1) the venture could possess market 
power with respect to the jointly produced product (essentially 
act like a single firm with monopoly power) or (2) the fact that 
the venturers remain competitors in other arenas might either 
distort the way the joint product is managed or allow the ventures 
to use the joint product as a smokescreen behind which to cut 
deals to reduce competition in other areas.
22
 
 
might be one adopted more for the protection of individual league members 
from competition than to help the league. 
Id. (emphasis added). Suggesting that sports league owners might be subject to antitrust 
liability for an agreement that enhanced the league’s ability to compete, because the 
agreement might be outweighed by anticompetitive effects, has been characterized as 
“nonsense” by the leading academic advocate of the now-rejected view that sports leagues 
should be treated as single entities.  See Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of 
Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 943 n.4 (1988).  Dean Roberts perhaps exaggerates, but agreements 
among competitors that enhanced the league’s ability to compete by increasing consumer 
appeal would typically be questioned only under the monopolization precedents of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Craig R. Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: 
Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999). 
Roberts’s concern is overstated, though, as there does not appear to be any precedent where 
a court actually held that a sports league agreement found to be reasonably necessary to 
enable the league to more effectively compete in a broader market was nonetheless struck 
down because of some overall balancing of effects.  Dean Roberts accurately states that the 
“concepts of competition and consumer welfare demand that every producer act vigorously 
to make itself optimally efficient.” However, he overlooks the fact that sports leagues 
governed by self-interested club owners often do not act in ways that are efficient. Roberts, 
supra, at 943 n.4.  See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE 
WORLD, UNITE! A (CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS 7–9, 14–22 (2008) 
(providing a catalogue of examples). 
 21. This suggestion has been reversed by the Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Needle.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010). 
 22. Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Once a court has determined that a joint 
venture’s decisions will not be checked by marketplace rivalry, the significant risk to 
consumers means that finding club-run sports leagues to be single entities would result in a 
high chance of false negatives (dismissing cases where anti-competitive conduct exists), and 
thus the time and expense of antitrust litigation to closely scrutinize the decisions of 
conflict-ridden leagues would be justified.  Thus, this argument is also consistent with the 
view that courts maximize consumer welfare by adopting rules that account for error costs 
and administrative costs.  Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! 
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An illustration of “distortion” in league management arguably 
occurred concerning the sale of broadcast rights by the clubs in soccer’s 
English Premier League (EPL).  In the early 1990s, EPL clubs agreed to 
bar individual clubs from negotiating broadcast rights arrangements, and to 
collectively sell the rights to 60 of the 380 games each year to Sky Sports, a 
satellite programmer.  In doing so, the EPL clubs precluded competition 
that would have resulted in many more games being telecast, which would 
have driven down the per game rights fees.
23
  More curiously, the EPL 
clubs rejected an offer from Sky Sports to televise an additional thirty 
games for a commensurately higher fee, because the clubs could not agree 
on how to divide the additional profits.
24
  Consumers thus suffered doubly:  
first, by the reduction of output from that which would occur if clubs sold 
their rights individually, and second, by the reduction of output below a 
monopolist’s profit-maximizing level, because of inefficiencies in market 
structure. 
II.  FORMATION V. STRUCTURE 
Antitrust courts should evaluate challenges to joint venture decisions 
with a clear focus on formation and structure.  First, courts should 
determine if consumers can readily protect themselves against exploitation 
by shifting their patronage to substitute goods and services; if so, there is 
no cause for competitive concern and the inquiry ends.
25
  Second, courts 
should review the venture’s formation:  if the venture should be dissolved 
and the principals required to compete, rather than collaborate, then further 
inquiry is required.
26
  Third, if the venture carries the potential for pro-
competitive benefits, notwithstanding the absence of vigorous rivalry from 
competitors, the court should examine whether the venture’s structure 
 
Long Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2010 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 369, 398 (2010). 
 23. A natural experiment of this phenomenon occurred in the 1980s in American 
college football.  Annual rights fees in excess of $75 million dropped sharply in value after 
the Supreme Court outlawed the NCAA’s strict output limiting rules in NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  The result was a reduction in prices per game from just under 
$1 million per game to $250,000, a slight increase in total game attendance, and the 
televising of nearly three times as many games.  PAUL C. WEILER, GARY R. ROBERTS, ROGER 
I. ABRAMS & STEPHEN F. ROSS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 887–88 (4th ed. 2011). 
 24. ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20, at 8. 
 25. Cf. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (stating that 
“when interbrand competition exists . . . it provides a significant check on the exploitation of 
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand 
of the same product”). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 434 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (enjoining a joint venture to create a pay television network among the four 
major motion picture studios). 
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poses significant risks of competitive harm. 
Antitrust resolution of formation issues closely resembles merger 
analysis about which enforcers and practitioners have developed significant 
expertise.  Courts and agencies focus on the relevant markets in which the 
joint venture is likely to compete, and on whether the resulting reduction or 
elimination of competition among the parties to the venture presents too 
great a risk of consumer exploitation.  Even if there is a significant risk that 
rivals will not constrain the venture’s ability to impose higher prices, lower 
output, or output unresponsive to consumer demand,
27
 the venture may 
promise sufficient efficiencies to enhance overall consumer welfare.  For 
example, a venture may prove necessary to create new and distinct 
products. 
Potential efficiencies from a joint venture may therefore justify 
competitor collaboration despite the lack of swift market retribution from 
rivals.  Thus, the federal government’s Competitor Collaboration 
Guidelines provide that antitrust agencies will examine the markets in 
which joint ventures will operate and, even if such an examination 
indicates anticompetitive harms, the investigation will turn to “whether the 
relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive 
benefits that likely would offset anticompetitive harms.”
28
 
Certainly, the National Football League would claim that this is true 
of their league.  In these cases, American Needle signals the importance of 
considering the structure of the venture.  The Court’s analysis requires 
newfound emphasis on the likely effect of price, output, and consumer 
choice, and on whether decisions by a joint venture are being made by 
those solely interested in the success of the venture, or by those with 
interests separate from the firm.
29
  Where the structure of a venture allows 
the management to be solely concerned about the profitability of the overall 
firm, the venture’s post-formation decisions should be considered those of 
a single entity.  When management decisions reflect not only an interest in 
the venture’s profits, but also an interest in the parties’ individual profits, 
further antitrust scrutiny is required.
30
  In the latter case, decisions of a joint 
 
 27. This is the test articulated by the Court in NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107.  The focus on 
responsiveness to consumer demand is emphasized and expounded upon in Neil W. Averitt 
& Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J.  175, 230 (2007). 
 28. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES]. 
 29. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010) (reversing 
judgment for summary judgment for respondents’ Sherman Act § 1 claim of antitrust 
violations due to the collective decision-making regarding their individual enterprises that 
thereby prevented market choices). 
 30. Id. 
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venture with conflicting interests should be independently assessed under 
the rule of reason to determine their impact on price, output, and consumer 
responsiveness.  A government or private complaint may seek equitable 
relief to restructure the venture so that control is not vested in those with 
parochial interests.
31
 
This approach parallels corporate law’s business judgment rule.  The 
rule states that if a single corporation’s decisions are made by executives or 
boards of directors whose economic interests lie solely in the profitability 
of the corporation, courts should not second guess their judgment.
32
  If 
decisions are made by those who can economically benefit, either from 
 
 31. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 16 (1945) (striking down a 
by-law giving member newspapers a veto over applications to join the collaboration by local 
rivals).  Somewhat inconsistent with this approach is that followed by the antitrust 
enforcement agencies, as set forth in the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra 
note 28, § 1.3.  According to the Guidelines, when firms form a venture to eliminate entirely 
all competition between themselves in a relevant market, the federal antitrust agencies state 
that the venture will be analyzed as a merger.  This does not raise concerns where vigorous 
competition exists in the market, or when the elimination of competition itself lessens 
competition so that the venture’s formation would constitute a substantial lessening of 
competition in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). The agencies’ 
approach is problematic if a merger analysis results in the conclusion that vigorous 
competition will not remain in the market, but that the venture should be permitted to go 
forward because any potential harms from the venture’s ability to exercise market power are 
outweighed by demonstrable efficiencies.  See also FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2010), http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08 
/100819hmg.pdf (illustrating a set of guidelines pertaining to the federal antitrust laws that 
outline the set forms of analysis and applications of policy of the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission regarding mergers and acquisitions of possible competitors).  
In this instance, there is a risk that the venture’s structure could lead the principals to reduce 
output or render output unresponsive to consumer demand in the relevant market, not for the 
purpose of achieving monopoly profits in that market, but to protect some strategic 
parochial advantage for one of the principals in another market.  For example, in American 
Needle, the NFL clubs agreed to eliminate competition between themselves in the licensed 
merchandise market. Suppose the reviewing agency were to conclude that this gave NFL 
Properties market power, but the efficiencies of joint licensing outweighed the harms.  
Because NFL Properties is governed by the member clubs acting in their own parochial 
interests, there is a risk that consumers of licensed hats and jerseys may suffer because the 
owners would forego business initiatives that would hurt their ability to compete in the labor 
market.  A literal reading of the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES would preclude 
an evaluation of that risk, or the possibility of requiring NFL Properties to structure its 
venture so as to place decision-making in the hands of those solely concerned with the 
overall welfare of NFL Properties.  In contrast, in a real merger, this risk is absent because 
the merged company will have a single governance structure.  Absent § 1.3, the typical joint 
venture approach would apply to the creation of NFL Properties; thus, where there is a 
likelihood of anticompetitive harm, the COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES direct the 
agency staff to focus on “Control of the Collaboration’s Competitively significant Decision 
Making,” and “the extent to which the collaboration’s governance structure enables the 
collaboration to act as an independent decision maker.”  Id. § 3.34(d). 
 32. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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enhancing corporate profitability or from a decision that fails to optimize 
corporate wealth but allows individual profit, the court should review, with 
care, the details of the transaction to assure that the result is in the best 
interests of the corporation.
33 
This approach is also consistent with the long-standing antitrust 
treatment of potentially anticompetitive practices arising in the context of 
franchise relationships.  Decisions that lessen competition among 
franchisees, resulting from agreements by self-interest rival franchisees, are 
subject to close antitrust scrutiny.  However, the very same decision that 
demonstrably comes from the unilateral decision of a franchisor motivated 
by maximizing profits for the enterprise is evaluated differently.
34
  A 
typical franchise policy is not the product of a conspiracy among 
franchisees, because the decision is not a joint one made by them but a 
unilateral one made by the franchisor.
35
 
There are a wide variety of joint ventures—sports leagues being 
among the most well-known—where the elimination of some competition 
between rivals creates market power, but also results in significant 
efficiencies and consumer benefits through the ability of the parties to offer 
products that inherently require collaboration.  Other examples recognized 
by courts include the collaboration among holders of musical copyrights 
for blanket licenses of all music in their repertoire,
36
 and various standard-
 
 33. Compare id. at 780 (“we do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision 
of the directors was a correct one . . . . the decision is one properly before directors and the 
motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest 
in their making of that decision”), with Croton River Club v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners 
Ass’n, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995)  (noting a decision made by a corporate director 
with interest in the decision renders the business judgment rule inapplicable and the burden 
is on board to “demonstrate that its actions were reasonable and/or fair”) (citing Alpert v. 28 
Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 26 (N.Y. 1984)). 
 34. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966);  see also Brief for 
the United States at 22, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9) (“the 
source of the territorial restriction is not an independent third party but the very sellers 
whom the restriction is designed to shield from competition”). 
 35. See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise 
Systems after American Needle, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 220 (2011) (“Franchise systems 
generally are much more likely than the NFL and NFLP arrangements to pass the critical 
test that the arrangement does not bring together separate decision makers. NFLP was 
controlled by the NFL teams, which were potential economic competitors; the decision to 
grant exclusive licenses was made by a vote of the teams. In contrast, numerous operational 
decisions in many franchise systems are made by (or, at least, are subject to approval by) 
one decision maker, i.e., the franchisor.”). See also Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F. 
Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev. 1992) (emphasizing the degree of control exercised by the 
dominant corporation), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 36. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (holding 
that blanket licenses, created by music companies that act as clearinghouses for copyright 
owners, were not per se violations of price fixing under antitrust law). 
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setting organizations.
37
  When a venture with market power is structured so 
that its decisions are distorted by the parochial self-interest of individual 
principals, consumers are likely to suffer.  To successfully protect 
consumers, American Needle will hopefully facilitate a renewed focus on 
the governance of the venture, perhaps even mandating that parties 
structure the venture so that it operates efficiently, and that initiatives that 
are both welfare-enhancing and profit-maximizing are not thwarted by the 
parochial self-interest of individual principals. 
There are several ways for courts or enforcers to determine whether a 
decision reflects the interests of the firm as a whole or parochial self-
interest.  Where the formal structure of a joint venture vests effective 
decision-making authority in persons whose legal and economic incentives 
lie exclusively with the promotion of the profitability of the venture as a 
whole, then absent a showing of sham, pretext, or other evidence that the 
decision reflects parochial interests, the venture’s subsequent decisions 
should be considered as those of a single entity.  Where the structure is 
more ambiguous, courts can borrow from the antitrust test for the existence 
of multi-party conspiracies:  is there evidence that the decision is 
inconsistent with that of the venture as a whole, but consistent with the 
interests of individual members?  Since this is a threshold question, the lack 
of evidence of any conflict between the venture as a whole and individual 
members should result in summary dismissal of a complaint challenging 
particular venture decisions.  However, to avoid summary dismissal, it 
should be sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that a conflict-ridden 
decision is plausible.  A rule of reason analysis is appropriate to determine 
if indeed the challenged decision is inefficient and welfare-reducing. 
The proposed two-part test requires defendants seeking to dismiss 
Sherman Act § 1 claims on single entity grounds to demonstrate that the 
challenged decision was made by those with both a legal and economic 
duty to act for the venture as a whole.  This is superior to language in some 
pre-Needle lower court decisions that suggest a disjunctive test.  For 
example, an otherwise insightful Ninth Circuit decision recognized the 
significant collaborative benefits of a multiple listing service for real estate 
brokers.
38
  However, the court rejected a claim that a corporation set up by 
potential competitor associations was a single entity with regard to the 
challenged policy because the decision was made by those with 
independent economic interests.
39
  In doing so, the court observed that 
“[w]here there is substantial common ownership, a fiduciary obligation to 
 
 37. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW § 35.2d (2002) (describing the legal treatment of standard-setting organizations). 
 38. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003). 
      39.  Id. at 1151. 
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act for another entity’s economic benefit or an agreement to divide profits 
and losses, individual firms function as an economic unit and are generally 
treated as a single entity.”
40
  This language is a bit imprecise.  Firms with 
market power that have substantial common ownership could well disserve 
consumers if the degree of unshared profits is sufficient to lead a 
significant shareholder minority to block a welfare-enhancing, venture-
profiting innovation.  A fiduciary duty to act for the interests of the venture 
as a whole, in theory, should be sufficient to allow antitrust courts to 
presume that actions do in fact reflect venture-maximizing conduct.  
However, fiduciary duty is a private law remedy and there are a variety of 
reasons why parties could flaunt this duty, with resulting public harm.
41
  
Finally, a division of profits and losses with regard to joint venture 
activities is insufficient by itself to remove the likelihood that firms might 
have outside competitive interests that would lead them to distort the 
venture’s operations to further parochial self-interest.
42
 
Sports antitrust cases litigated prior to American Needle are consistent 
with this approach.  In the landmark Raiders case,
43
 the jury’s verdict 
against the NFL was upheld based on evidence that the relocation of the 
Raiders’ home site from Oakland to Los Angeles posed no demonstrable 
harm to the league, but was rejected by league owners in order to protect 
the Los Angeles Rams (and, by way of precedent, their own clubs in future 
cases) from the threat of new local competition.
44
  The plaintiffs’ 
evidence—having two teams in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and 
only one in the San Francisco Bay Area was no less attractive for fans than 
the reverse—showed that the NFL’s decision was inconsistent with that of 
the venture as a whole.
45
  If a single shareholder owned the NFL, then if the 
 
      40.   Id. at 1148 (emphasis added). 
 41. The ability of private investors with reasonable foresight to adequately protect their 
own interests is a topic for corporate law, not this Essay.  Reliance on private litigation for 
breach of fiduciary duty or to challenge self-dealings that fall outside the business judgment 
rule is insufficient to protect the public interest in the efficient operation of a venture with 
market power.  For this reason, sound antitrust policy requires that firms not be treated as 
single-entities unless directors have both a legal and an economic interest in maximizing the 
value of the venture as a whole.  See also N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, No. 9343, 2011 
LEXIS 137, at 118–122 (F.T.C. July 14, 2011) (rejecting the claim that ethical and legal 
duties for self-interested dentists-regulators to enact regulations contrary to their own 
economic interests precluded a finding that the adopted regulation constituted concerted 
action among competing dentists). 
 42. See Block & Ridings, supra note 35, discussing how NFL teams that equally share 
licensing income might block initiatives that increase overall league income if it resulted in 
disproportionate benefits to other clubs that could lead those clubs to gain a competitive 
advantage in labor markets. 
 43. Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 44. Id. at 1395–97. 
 45. Id. at 1399. 
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plaintiffs’ evidence is to be believed, she would have decreed that there 
should be two teams in Los Angeles.
46
 
Sullivan v. National Football League is another case where the 
structure of a league’s governance may have affected league policy.  The 
case involved a challenge to the NFL’s unique rule barring club ownership 
by corporations.
47
  The league observed that the policy actually reduced the 
potential market value of clubs.  (For this reason, the NFL argued 
unsuccessfully that, as matter of antitrust doctrine, ownership interests in 
sports clubs did not constitute a relevant market for antitrust purposes.)   
However, the jury also heard evidence by prominent sports economist 
Roger Noll that the rule’s effect was to preclude competition by more 
efficient organizational structures.  If believed, this evidence showed that 
the owners had adopted a policy inconsistent with the best interests of the 
NFL as a whole.  That is to say, if a single shareholder owned the league 
(like the France family owns NASCAR, a private corporation that 
organizes the premier stock car auto racing competition in North 
America),
48
 she would presumably prefer the most efficient mix of club 
structures. 
Labor market issues provide another illustration of how the structure 
of a league can affect league policies.  All sports leagues have an interest in 
allocating athletic talent among the clubs in a manner designed to provide a 
sporting competition that maximizes fan appeal (and thus revenue).  Club-
run leagues, however, have a conflicting interest in holding down labor 
costs, even at the expense of an appeal-maximizing competition.  Whether 
or not any particular club-adopted league policy is anticompetitive depends 
on the individual facts.  Several examples, however, illustrate this point.  
Major League Baseball’s attendance and competitive balance improved 
substantially after the strict “reserve clause” was lifted in 1976.  MLB 
owners were not foolish to have maintained a scheme that rendered output 
unresponsive to consumer demand, however, because while attendance 
indeed rose 57 percent in the seven-year period following the end of the 
reserve clause, salaries during that period skyrocketed by 316 percent.
49
  
Similarly, the National Hockey League enjoyed admirable competitive 
balance at the turn of the century, with twelve different teams playing in 
the Stanley Cup semi-finals over the 2002–04 seasons, but the clubs locked 
players out for an entire season to secure a salary cap that prevents under-
performing teams in major markets from improving to a level that their 
fans demand.
50
  In contrast, consider the labor rules in two highly 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 48. NASCAR’s structure is detailed in ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20, at 70–108. 
 49. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1989). 
 50. Stephen F. Ross, The NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, the Competition 
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successful leagues where labor rules are not controlled by the clubs.  
Although NASCAR has voluminous engineering rules designed to promote 
competitive balance among competing race car teams, there are no rules 
that prohibit star drivers or talented crew chiefs or engineers from 
switching employers at the end of their existing contracts.
51
  An 
independent board of directors who are concerned solely with the interests 
of the overall league adopted a salary cap for the Indian Premier League.  
Unlike North American sports leagues, the rules permit clubs who have 
signed overpaid, underperforming players to buy out their contracts, release 
them, and then bring in new talent, with any buyout payments not counted 
against the cap.
52
  Thus, unlike under-performing NHL teams, inferior 
Indian cricket teams can quickly improve by investing in better talent. 
In sum, a workable standard to implement the Court’s renewed focus 
on inefficiently structured joint ventures proceeds as follows.  First, a 
plaintiff would need to establish that a particular venture’s inefficiencies 
will not be swiftly corrected by marketplace competition.  Second, a 
defendant would win summary dismissal of a § 1 claim where the venture’s 
structure is such that the challenged decision was made by those whose 
legal (i.e. fiduciary duty) and economic incentives were to maximize the 
interests of the venture-as-a-whole.  Where a venture’s structure was more 
ambiguous, to survive summary dismissal the plaintiff would need to 
present plausible evidence that the challenged decision(s) reflected 
parochial self-interest of the venture’s principals.
53
 
In a rapid-reaction “post-game commentary” on American Needle, 
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp foreswears a categorical line-drawing test 
such as the one I have proposed.
54
  Instead, he suggests that a critical 
 
Act, and Public Policy, 37 U.B.C. L. REV. 343 (2004). 
 51. ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 20 at 100–02. 
 52. Interview with Sean Morris, Chief Executive Officer, Rajasthan Royals (June 2, 
2010). 
 53. A plaintiff can always challenge the formation of the venture itself. 
 54. Herbert Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust 
Law June 1, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625 [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Firm 
Boundaries]; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 365.  Another advocate of a 
categorical approach, Richard Brunell,  has written, in regard to joint venture maven Joseph 
Brodley’s work: 
 [it] suggests a straightforward answer to the question of when Copperweld should 
apply to joint ventures:  as long as the members that control the venture are 
independent economic actors with interests that might diverge from the joint 
venture as an independent business unit, then the venture should not be treated as 
a single entity under § 1, regardless of the degree of functional integration or 
economic interdependence of the members (short of a merger). While the Court 
did not expressly adopt this test, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with it. 
Richard M. Brunell, Professor Brodley’s General Contributions to Antitrust Scholarship: 
Some Thoughts on Professor Brodley’s Contributions to Antitrust Through the Eye of 
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criterion is whether the venture is conducting its own business rather than 
being involved in the separate businesses of its individual team members.
55
  
For example, he suggests that a league’s decision to fire an executive in the 
commissioner’s office would not be subject to antitrust challenge.  
Certainly, if the issue was the executive’s competence, it would be difficult 
for the fired official to demonstrate that the decision was inconsistent with 
the interests of the league as a whole.  But suppose the league’s chief 
marketing officer had advocated giving teams more of an entrepreneurial 
incentive to innovate, and was then dismissed under pressure by club 
owners who did not want to compete with each other in marketing?
56
 
A league’s decision as to the schedule for regular season games is 
another example that might be characterized as a league conducting “its 
own business.” Typically, one would expect league schedules to be 
designed to advance the overall welfare of the league, but not always.  For 
example, several years ago, the National Hockey League staff proposed a 
schedule that increased the games played against clubs in the other 
conference, which was designed to display the talent of stars like Pittsburgh 
Penguin Sidney Crosby and Washington Capital Alex Ovechkin in west 
coast venues.  However, because schedules have to be approved by owners, 
the east coast owners reportedly vetoed the schedule to reduce their own 
travel costs.
57
  To be clear, not every single schedule dispute would be 
subjected to a full-fledge rule of reason analysis under my approach.  To 
survive summary dismissal of a § 1 claim, the plaintiff would have to 
provide plausible evidence that could lead a fact-finder to conclude that the 
challenged decision was made by those with distinctive competitive 
 
American Needle, 90 B. U. L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2010). 
 55. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13. 
 56. This analysis is consistent with the second look at this case in AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 357 (stating that league operations “should be regarded as 
unilateral because, unless deeper probing shows otherwise, these decisions have no impact 
on the market behavior of the individual teams”) (emphasis added). 
 57. At the owners’ meeting in January, 2007, a proposal to increase the number of inter-
conference games on the NHL schedule was defeated on a 19–11 ownership vote, with two-
thirds required for passage.  See Jody Vance, The Schedule Needs to be Fixed, Toronto Sun, 
Jan. 25, 2007, at 38; Tarik El-Bashir, Live Online: The Washington Capitals, 
washingtonpost.com, Jan. 26, 2007, 2:00PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2007/01/18/DI2007011801285.html. 
  There is one reported case suggesting that, contrary to the assumption made by all 
parties in other sports league litigation, club owners who control league decisions indeed 
owe a fiduciary duty to their fellow owners in making important league decisions.  Prof’l 
Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass’n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(noting that when owners “sit on the board of directors of [the league], to the extent they 
have common corporate goals, they have a duty to make decisions for the benefit of the 
corporation, the hockey league as a whole”).  There are no reported judicial or internal 
league decisions suggesting that the owners in the four major North American professional 
sports leagues perceive that they incur such a duty. 
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interests (i.e., the owners) and that the decision was not likely one that 
would have been made by those solely concerned with the profitability of 
the league as a whole.
58
 
The categorical approach’s clarity is exemplified by a post-Needle 
sports decision, Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.
59
  
The court of appeals properly rejected a challenge to a rule adopted by the 
sanctioning body for motorsports dirt track racing that required all 
competitors to use a single tire.
60
  The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ 
own expert acknowledged that the decision to adopt the challenged rule 
was made by the sanctioning body in its own best interest.
61
  Yet the court 
went on in dicta to offer general commentary about the need to accord 
“sports organizations a certain deference and freedom” with regard to 
contracts with suppliers.
62
  Such deference is certainly justified when, as in 
the case sub judice, the decision was made by an independent body.  But 
 
 58. This result is not inconsistent with an alternative test suggested by the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division in its amicus brief in American Needle: “teams act as a 
single entity only with respect to aspects of their operations that have been effectively 
merged, and only when the restraint does not affect competition among the teams, or the 
teams and the league, outside their merged operations.”  Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 
(2010) (No. 08-661).  The NHL scheduling controversy arose because individual east coast 
club owners did not merge their operations with regard to local broadcast rights, and 
continued to compete on the ice, so that these owners were motivated to block a proposed 
schedule that might optimize overall league revenues or league appeal.  The Essay’s test is 
superior, and indeed somewhat more favorable to leagues, in the instance where a league’s 
owners may not have effectively merged all operations, but have vested decision-making 
authority in those without parochial self-interest.  See text accompanying note 60, infra, 
discussing Major League Baseball Advanced Media. 
  The Justice Department’s amicus brief likewise glosses over this problem in a 
blanket statement that “teams do not compete in establishing the rule of on-field play, but 
rather have effectively merged their operation with respect to such decisions.”  To use 
another hockey example, consider the important rules changes adopted by the NHL after the 
2005 lockout, designed to speed up the game, increase scoring, and increase the game’s 
attractiveness to fans.  NHL, OFFICIAL RULES 1, 21, 31, 65, 89 (2005–06), 
http://www.nhlofficials.com/images/Rules001-084.pdf.; NHL, NHL Enacts Rules Changes, 
Creates Competition Committee, NHL.COM (July 22, 2005), http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/ 
ruleschanges072205.html. The new rules were not optimal for all teams:  most notably, the 
Minnesota Wild under legendary coach Jacques Lemaire used the old rules to prevail in 
boring, defense-oriented contests.  Minnesota Wild Historical Moments, SPORTS 
ECYCLOPEDIA (June 17, 2011, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nhl/minnesota/minwild.html.  If a plaintiff could show 
that a conflicted Board of Governors, acting in their own parochial commercial self-interest, 
blocked a welfare-enhancing rule for on-ice play, that should be a legitimate basis for 
antitrust review. 
 59. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57 (7th Cir. 2010). 
      60.   Id. at 78. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 80. 
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suppose the exact same rule had been adopted by a board consisting 
entirely of existing racing teams, and that the plaintiff had credible 
evidence that the rule was adopted to preclude innovative competition by 
new drivers at the expense of established incumbents?  A categorical 
approach properly distinguishes, not on the basis of the substance of a rule, 
but on the conflict-free nature of the decision to adopt the rule. 
A prime focus on the incentives of decision-makers is fully consistent 
with the Court’s earlier decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher.
63
  In that case, 
rival oil companies Shell and Texaco combined all their retail marketing in 
the western United States into a joint venture, Equilon.  The Court held that 
the complete integration of all economic activity in the relevant geographic 
and product markets meant that the agreement was not per se illegal price 
fixing.
64
  A challenge to the pricing scheme based on the elimination of 
rivalry between Shell and Texaco could have been brought, but was not, 
under the rule of reason.
65
  If, however, the venture’s formation was not 
challenged, and the only challenge was to a post-formation decision by 
Equilon to charge identical prices for Shell- and Texaco-brand products, 
the decision would have been immune from § 1 scrutiny unless the plaintiff 
could present evidence that the decision was not in the best interests of 
Equilon, but rather was furthering some parochial interest of one or both 
parties.
66
 
III.  APPLYING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH: THREE SCENARIOS 
A review of three scenarios will hopefully demonstrate the value of a 
categorical approach to the single entity issue, focusing on conflict-free 
governance.  Such an approach provides clear guidance in a manner 
 
   63. 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., James A. Keyte, American Needle: A New Quick Look for Joint Ventures, 
25 ANTITRUST 48, 50 (2010) (suggesting a wide range of unitary behavior (and, hence, no 
§ 1 scrutiny for ongoing operations) for joint ventures structured like Equilon).  Keyte 
mistakenly concludes, id., that Dagher suggests that NFL Properties’ ongoing decisions 
would be immune from § 1 scrutiny if NFL clubs’ intellectual property were lawfully 
assigned to the league subsidiary.  In Dagher, the principals structured the Equilon joint 
venture so that Shell and Texaco were passive investors.  See Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, 
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) No. (04-805, 04-814), 2005 WL 2229874.  
(describing joint venture principals’ gains and losses dependent on overall profitability of 
the venture, so that the principals “stood in the same relation to the new [joint venture] as do 
shareholders to a corporation”).  Although not pursued by the plaintiffs, the Equilon venture 
was most vulnerable to a rule of reason challenge (there was evidence that prices in some 
local markets had increased post-venture) because the decision to price Shell- and Texaco-
brand gasoline identically was not a decision made by the Equilon joint venture after 
formation, but a pre-venture requirement negotiated by Shell and Texaco in their own 
parochial self-interest. 
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consistent with the purposes for which the Court in Copperweld and 
American Needle has drawn the distinction between collaborative and 
unilateral conduct under the antitrust laws. 
As the Court explained, decisions resulting from an agreement 
between two or more economic actors require closer examination because 
of their potential to harm consumers, while decisions of a single economic 
actor (far more common in the economy) are less likely to harm consumers 
absent a specific threat of monopolization.
67
  Justice Stevens noted that the 
central evil addressed by § 1 is the elimination of competition that would 
otherwise exist.
68
  When a decision is made by a joint venture controlled by 
self-interested parties who retain some competitive relationship with one 
another, there is a risk that the decision is not efficient, but rather designed 
to stifle remaining competition between the principals.  In contrast, when a 
decision is made by a joint venture controlled by those solely concerned 
with the interests of the venture-as-a-whole, this risk presumptively is 
eliminated, and the sole question should be whether the venture’s initial 
elimination of competition is lawful, and whether any subsequent decisions 
risk monopolization. 
First, a useful contrast might be drawn between NFL Properties, which 
the Supreme Court concluded was an agreement among the thirty-two NFL 
club owners, and Major League Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM).
69
  
Unlike NFL Properties, which is governed by all NFL club owners, 
MLBAM was established in 2000 as a business entity governed by a Board 
of Directors including the MLB President (an executive working under the 
Commissioner) and some but not all owners.
70
  Assuming that MLBAM’s 
governing documents do not contain bizarre terms that would allow this 
subset of owners to put their own club’s interests over those of the other 
owners who are shareholders in the venture, decisions by MLBAM of how 
to license properties assigned to it would presumptively be considered the 
decision of a single entity.  Under the categorical approach, because 
MLBAM is governed by a board of directors whose members have a legal 
obligation to act only in the best interests of MLBAM as a whole, a 
plaintiff seeking to challenge a specific board decision would have to show 
that the directors’ economic interests were sufficiently parochial as to 
 
 67. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010). 
 68. Id. at 2212. 
 69. Because Major League Baseball and its Advanced Media subsidiary are private 
entities, they have not publicly revealed their Articles of Association or other documents 
relating to corporate governance, and MLB officials declined to provide the author with 
sufficient information on which to authoritatively base this analysis.  Thus, the discussion 
that follows is based on logical deductions from the limited publicly available information 
about the relationship between MLB owners and MLB Advanced Media. 
 70. MLB Announces CEO For New Internet Initiative; Robert Bowman to Take The 
Helm of MLB Advanced Media, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 17, 2000. 
ROSS_FINALIZED_FIVE (DO NOT DELETE)   
280 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
trump their fiduciary duties.  Absent such a showing, decisions should be 
considered to be those of a single economic actor.  Thus, the only 
legitimate antitrust challenge to an MLBAM decision
71
 would be to attack 
the initial assignment of club assets for the purpose of collective licensing. 
A hypothetical marketing initiative exposing the conflict between the 
individual clubs’ interests and those of the league as a whole illustrates 
why American Needle properly found an NFL Properties’ decision to be an 
agreement among member clubs, while a similar decision by MLBAM may 
well be characterized as the decision of a single entity.  Most American 
sports leagues centralize virtually all marketing activities, although 
European sports league merchandise is marketed almost exclusively by 
each club.  Suppose NFLP and MLBAM executives independently reached 
the conclusion that neither extreme made sense, and that revenues could be 
enhanced significantly by permitting clubs to license certain properties 
themselves, keeping a small percent of the revenue and sharing the 
remainder with NFLP or MLBAM.  Suppose further that the league 
executives concluded that the likely result of this initiative would not be to 
enrich already wealthy clubs to such a degree that the fan appeal of the 
game would decline due to undue competitive imbalance.  In each case, 
although this initiative would enrich the league as a whole, and make all 
club owners better off collectively, some owners might do better than 
others; owners whose clubs are under-performing, or whose club-level 
marketing staff is below average, might perceive that their own interests 
would be better served foregoing this business opportunity, lest their rivals 
gain a competitive advantage.  In the case of NFLP, a substantial minority 
of owners, acting in their own self-interest, could (and likely would) block 
the initiative.  In the case of my stylized version of MLBAM, however, the 
Board would likely approve it; more specifically, an owner who felt that his 
own team was unlikely to be able to take advantage of this opportunity 
would nonetheless have a fiduciary duty to support the initiative if there 
was no question that it enriched MLBAM as a whole. 
The second scenario is less hypothetical:  how would American 
Needle affect the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the NBA broadcast litigation 
in Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA?
72
  Although Professor 
Hovenkamp ultimately concludes that an NBA rule limiting individual 
 
 71. This assumes the inapplicability of the antitrust exemption created by the Supreme 
Court in Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922), and reaffirmed in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 72. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  For a pre-American 
Needle critique, see Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, 
Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 552–54 (1997) (describing the 
performance of owners of major professional sports league to be inconsistent with notion of 
fiduciary duty to other sports owners or to the league as a whole). 
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clubs’ ability to sell broadcast rights nationally should be considered an 
agreement among the club owners rather than the unilateral decision of the 
NBA as a single entity, he finds this to be a closer and more difficult 
question than I do.
73
  Whether one looks at the structure of the joint 
venture, which is what Hovenkamp suggests Judge Easterbrook’s majority 
opinion did, or looks to the nature of the challenged restraint and the extent 
to which it may reflect independent and potentially competitive incentives, 
which is how Hovenkamp characterizes Justice Stevens’ approach in 
American Needle,
74
 the result is the same:  the decision was made by the 
NBA Board of Governors, who had no fiduciary duty or economic 
incentive to act to maximize profitability for the league as a whole. 
It may be true that, in some abstract sense, the NBA had an interest in 
maximizing the revenue of the NBA as a whole,
75
 but as Judge Richard 
Cudahy observed in his concurring opinion in the case,
76
 that interest is not 
necessarily shared by the NBA Board of Governors, which is comprised of 
each club’s owner or his designee.  Per the Coase Theorem, NBA rules 
would be irrelevant and the profit-maximizing result achieved in the 
presence of perfect information and the absence of transactions costs.
77
  
Neither condition exists with regard to sports licensing issues.  
Ascertaining the economic impact of the Chicago Bulls broadcasting their 
games nationally was uncertain and contested.  Throughout the litigation, 
the Bulls vigorously disputed the NBA’s claim that the telecasting of their 
games on the WGN cable superstation had a significant adverse impact 
either on the value of the NBA’s over-the-air network contract with NBC 
or on the value of individual club’s local rights sales.
78
  As with other 
 
 73. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 18.  The actual holding of the 
Seventh Circuit in Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. reversed the district court’s holding that the 
agreement was sufficiently anticompetitive that it could be barred on a quick look.  Instead, 
the court of appeals remanded the case for a full rule of reason analysis. 95 F.3d at 600. The 
parties then settled the case. 
 74. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 15. 
 75. Id. at 18. 
 76. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd., 95 F.3d at 601. 
 77. Roger G. Noll, Sports Economics after Fifty Years, SPORTS ECONOMICS AFTER FIFTY 
YEARS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIMON ROTTENBERG 17, 25 (Plácido Rodríguez, Stefan 
Késenne & Jaume García eds. 2006) (emphasizing the importance of the assumption of 
perfect information and costless bargaining with regard to the Nobel Prize-winning insight 
set forth in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). 
 78. Precise market research was not introduced, but the district court found no evidence 
that the WGN deal affected the value of the rights agreements with over-the-air network 
NBC and another cable superstation, TBS (games shown on those stations were not shown 
at the same time as Bulls games on WGN).  See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 874 F. 
Supp. 844, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev’d in part and remanded, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). 
  Although this claim may appear superficially counter-intuitive, more careful 
consideration provides the underlying business logic. Bidding for rights sales is highly 
competitive among networks, and involves imperfect predictions of the economic value of 
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sports leagues, significant transactions costs, that is, the inability of the 
clubs to agree among themselves how to divide up the profits, appear to 
have precluded an efficient arrangement here.
79
 
Suppose, however, that the NBA were governed as is NASCAR and 
the Indian Premier League (cricket) by an independent board of directors 
responsible only to maximize profitability for the league as a whole.  
Transaction costs problems would be solved:  if selling Bulls games on 
WGN produced more additional revenue than potential revenue losses from 
other rights sales, the NBA would surely allow these games to be seen 
nationally. 
This case illustrates why a categorical approach is more appropriate 
for antitrust litigation challenging sports league policies agreed to by self-
interested club owners.  Since the Sherman Act is a consumer welfare 
prescription,
80
 the antitrust laws ought to reflect a concern when consumers 
are deprived of desired sports broadcasts because of bargaining 
inefficiencies in a joint venture with market power.  In such a case, the 
hallmarks of an unreasonable trade restraint—an anti-consumer effect on 
price, output, or responsiveness to consumer choice—would be present.
81
 
A non-sports example provides the final illustration of how the 
categorical approach assists courts in fulfilling the goals of § 1:  the 
ongoing litigation over fees charged to retailers to process credit card 
purchases.  A full examination of the myriad allegations of anticompetitive 
conduct in this market is of course beyond the scope of this essay.  To 
grossly summarize, Visa and Mastercard originated as associations of 
competing banks offering credit card processing services (in addition to the 
actual provision of credit to consumers, for which consumers are directly 
charged fees and interest on credit extended).  Two distinct processing 
 
the rights being acquired.  Absent a strong likelihood that WGN superstation broadcast 
would significantly hurt ratings for other games, bidders for those games are not likely to 
take the WGN broadcasts into account.  Bulls’ games shown on a local cable channel in 
Chicago averaged 350,000 viewers, while Bulls’ games shown on WGN averaged 650,000 
nationwide.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship. v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 
1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). The trial court estimated that the viewership 
outside Chicago after 1990 was 336,000, and WGN’s general manager estimated that at 
least half of these viewers are in cities that do not have NBA teams.  Id.  Thus, an average of 
less than 6000 viewers in each NBA city were watching each Bulls’ game.  Even so, of 
these fans, some were likely Bulls fans who would not have watched any other game in any 
event.  Many others were likely avid NBA fans, who likely watched the Bulls/WGN 
broadcast in addition to watching their favorite local team. Thus, it is quite plausible that the 
substitution effect of Bulls’ games for those sold by the NBA or other teams was minimal. 
 79. See Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross, Necessary Restraints and Inefficient 
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 1 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 27 (2000) (discussing the English 
Premier League example discussed in text accompanying supra note 23). 
 80. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
 81. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984). 
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services are offered by banks:  “acquiring banks” settle accounts with 
merchants, and then are reimbursed by “issuing banks,” who have a direct 
relationship with the card-holding consumer.  The “merchant discount” (the 
amount less than the price charged to the consumer’s credit card actually 
received by the merchant) reflects a variety of fees, including ones charged 
by the acquiring bank, Visa or Mastercard, and the issuing bank.
82
 
According to merchants and other critics of this process, a variety of 
factors distort free market forces in this industry, resulting in claims that 
these fees, and in particular the “interchange fee” charged by issuing banks, 
are far too high in the United States.
83
  Visa and Mastercard control a huge 
share of the market, dominance developed in part by exclusionary practices 
that prevented rival card brands from developing relationships with banks.
84  
Both credit card companies require merchants to honor all cards carrying 
their brand, even if the fees charged to the merchants vary widely.  Most 
significantly, both insert clauses in contracts with merchants that 
significantly limit merchants’ ability to pass-on to consumers any reduced 
fees that might induce them to use a particular bank’s credit card.
85
 
Merchants have filed antitrust challenges to the interchange fees that 
historically were fixed by competing banks participating in what were 
structured as joint ventures.  To avoid charges of price fixing, both Visa 
and Mastercard restructured through initial public offerings, so that the 
interchange fee is now fixed by separate corporate entities, rather than 
competing banks.  Are the defendants now a “single entity,” so that the 
interchange fee, allegedly set at artificially high levels, is immune from 
antitrust scrutiny?
86
 
Professor Hovenkamp claims that American Needle should not 
prevent courts from examining interchange fees under § 1.
87
  He argues that 
 
 82. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(providing a full background on the mechanics of the processing services offered and 
interactions between banks). Many of these issues are currently pending in In re Payment 
Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F.Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (concerning Sherman Act violations arising from processing fees charged by 
providers of payment network services). 
 83. See Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5546, Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Antitrust Task Force, 110th Cong. 98–100 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings] 
(statement of W. Stephen Cannon on Behalf of the Merchants Payments Coalition, Inc. 
discussing the anti-competitive nature of interchange fees). 
 84. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 85. Hearings, supra note 83. 
 86. If the interchange fee is set by a single entity, it is not an agreement among rival 
banks subject to challenge under § 1; the high fees themselves cannot be the basis of 
proving a violation of § 2, which focuses on unlawful acquisition or maintenance of 
monopoly power, not the “mere possession” of that power by a monopolist.  Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
 87. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13–14.  For a similar conclusion, 
see Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 871. 
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rules that limit the independent businesses of participating banks should not 
be treated any differently now that Visa and MasterCard are supposedly 
independently owned.
88
  Governance is irrelevant because “the 
corporation’s directors are obliged to maximize the corporation’s value, 
which occurs when it achieves the cartel-like output.”
89
 
My approach likely yields the same result, but via a different path.  If 
the Visa and MasterCard IPOs did nothing more than transfer cartel 
management from competing banks to a separate entity whose economic 
incentives were aligned with the desires of participating “issuing banks” to 
charge excessive interchange fees, then the IPO itself should likely be 
struck down, or at least the “veil” of independence pierced as a sham.
90
  
But, according to MasterCard’s securities filings, the corporation’s 
revenues are not based on a percentage of interchange fees or bank profits, 
but rather “from the fees that we charge our customers for providing 
transaction processing and other payment-related services (operations fees) 
and by assessing our customers based primarily on the dollar volume of 
activity on the cards that carry our brands (assessments).”
91
 
If, as critics claim, there is evidence that the interchange fee is not at a 
competitive level,
92
 then banks issuing MasterCard credit cards could 
reduce their fee and permit merchants to pass on the savings to consumers, 
which would result in more consumers using MasterCard credit cards.  This 
would increase the dollar volume of activity on MasterCard-branded cards, 
and thus increase the profits for MasterCard.  This analysis suggests that 
the corporation’s value is not maximized by a cartel-like output, absent 
collusion with its rival Visa.  Rather, if the revenue model for the 
corporation is primarily based on maximizing the dollar volume of card 
activity, this puts the corporation in a typical arms-length, quasi-
 
 88. Hovenkamp, Firm Boundaries, supra note 54, at 13–14. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967) (holding that the 
territorial limitations by licensees of the parent company should be treated as horizontal 
violations of the Sherman Act).  Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 824, make the 
important point that if parties structure their economic activity as a joint venture vesting 
complete control in an independent board, it does not necessarily mean that the conduct is 
legal.  They note that if rival firms simply formed a new corporation to control independent 
firms’ output, the structure of the Board of Directors would be irrelevant.  The tests 
proposed in this Essay are appropriate only for agreements reflecting  a genuine economic 
integration that would otherwise be subject to the rule of reason. 
 91. MasterCard Worldwide, MasterCard Annual Report 2008, at 3 (2008), 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/newsroom/annual_report/MasterCard_Annual_
Report_2008.pdf. 
 92. These claims are seriously contested by those who claim either that the interchange 
fee is not exploitive or that any regulation is worse than the harm.  Sources on either side are 
listed in Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 13, at 869 n.278. 
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adversarial, vertical relationship with the issuing banks.
93
  But it suggests 
that Hovenkamp is correct in his conclusion that MasterCard should not be 
immune from § 1 scrutiny, because MasterCard has not made the slightest 
effort to force banks to lower interchange fees.  Assuming, arguendo, 
evidence that the fees are not priced at competitive levels, although the 
Board of Directors may formally be independent of the banks, the evidence 
is inconsistent with the way we would expect a truly independent entity to 
behave. 
In addition to claiming that the fees are actually at competitive levels 
(an issue to be resolved under a rule of a reason, given the plaintiffs’ 
plausible claim that the defendant is not a single entity), there remains 
another potential reply from MasterCard:  there is no reason to insist that 
banks issuing MasterCards lower their interchange fees because both 
MasterCard and Visa have contract provisions that prohibit merchants from 
passing on reduced fees for their own cards or competing cards.  Thus, 
even if Bank of America lowered its fees on its Penn State affinity 
MasterCard, the Nittany Lion Inn could not pass that fee savings on to 
customers because of its contract with Visa.  If this is true, then the 
competitive problem is not with the fixing of interchange fees, but with this 
tacit collusion between the two dominant credit card brands about highly 
restrictive and anticompetitive terms.  The bar on passing discounts onto 
consumers should be independently challenged under § 1
94
 or challenged 
by the Federal Trade Commission as an unfair method of competition. 
 
 93. Cf. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977) (discussing the 
similar relationship between manufacturers, who seek to maximize output of their products 
given the wholesale price and retailers, whose margins manufacturers prefer to narrow). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,659-60 
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (concerning government ordering modifications for company price books to 
avoid antitrust violations and remarking that private suits should be brought independently). 
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CONCLUSION 
In American Needle, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction 
between business entities whose key decisions are controlled by a single 
economic actor concerned solely with the profitability of the firm, and 
entities whose key decisions are controlled by those with their own 
individual profits apart from the venture’s economic welfare.
95
  Future 
antitrust analysis should resolve defendants’ claims that a decision was not 
an agreement subject to challenge under § 1 of the Sherman Act by 
focusing on whether the decision was made by those with legal (fiduciary 
duty) and economic incentives to advance the venture-as-a-whole.  
Evidence that the decision is inconsistent with the best interests of the 
venture-as-a-whole should lead courts to reject the single-entity defense. 
The Court’s decision will hopefully draw renewed attention to 
structural governance issues with regard to competitor collaborations where 
inefficient governance will not lead to swift market retribution.  Where 
there is evidence that such a joint venture’s decisions are guided by 
parochial self-interest of principals, courts should closely scrutinize 
challenged decisions for their effect on price, output, quality, and 
responsiveness to consumer demand.
96
 Where there is evidence of 
persistent inefficiency, courts should consider structural relief.
97
 
 
 95. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010). 
 96. This approach sharply contrasts with what seems likely to be the latest strategy that 
the clubs controlling the major sports leagues will adopt in the wake of their defeat on the 
single entity defense in American Needle.  Keyte, supra note 66, draws upon language in 
several sports antitrust decisions to argue that many antitrust challenges to club owners’ 
decisions ought to be subject to a “quick look” review in favor of the defendant.  
Unfortunately, his analysis fails to draw the critical distinction between agreements that 
further the interests of the leagues as a whole (either by improving competition with other 
sporting competitions or by increasing internal operational efficiency to the benefit of its 
fans) and agreements that actually harm both consumers and the league as a whole but are 
adopted in the parochial self-interest of owners.  Cf. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096–
97 (discussing the NFL’s ownership restrictions and their effect on trade).  Although a quick 
look rejection of a challenge might be appropriate if the dispute was solely about whether a 
particular owner would be an acceptable steward of a major franchise, see Levin v. NBA, 
385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and indeed a single entity defense ought to apply if the 
decision was made by a wholly disinterested board of directors of an independent 
competition organizer, see Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient 
Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the 
United Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 243–44 (2006), Sullivan properly allowed a 
jury to resolve the argument as to whether the rule’s primary effect was to further the 
league’s interest in long-term growth or, as the plaintiff’s expert claimed, to shelter family-
run clubs from more efficient competition. 
 97. Werden, supra note 13, at 8, writes that when “the formation of a joint venture 
yields obvious and substantial competitive benefits, only minimal antitrust analysis should 
be required to conclude that the venture does not violate Section 1.”  Similarly, the Justice 
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This approach advances the Sherman Act’s goal of promoting 
consumer welfare.  It recognizes that, where consumers cannot easily shift 
their patronage to substitute goods or services, a joint venture structured to 
protect the parochial self-interest of its principals can reduce output and 
render output unresponsive to consumer choice. 
 
 
Department’s amicus brief in American Needle, supra note 58, at 16, opines that “where 
teams have effectively merged an aspect of their operations”—that is, where they have 
completely eliminated competition among themselves in that activity—post-“merger” 
decisions that affect only that activity do not “raise the antitrust dangers that [Section] 1 was 
designed to police.” (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
769).  These somewhat blanket statements overlook the possibility that a venture’s 
formation could be on balance welfare enhancing, but the venture may be structured in a 
way that will significantly reduce the quantity or quality of output from the venture, 
compared to “what would otherwise be.” Cf. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984).  If a plaintiff can show that it is not reasonably necessary for the venture’s framers 
to vest governance in those with parochial self-interest, and that such a structure is 
demonstrably welfare-reducing compared to a venture structured to maximize the interests 
of the venture as a whole, this showing should preclude any quick-look victory for the 
defendant.  And where rivals effectively merge an aspect of their operations subject to 
“post-merger” decisions based on demonstrably output-reducing governance rules, these 
rules do indeed raise the precise antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to protect. 
